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1. Introduction 
Voluntary active euthanasia refers to a clearly competent patient making a voluntary and 
persistent request for aid in dying (Brock 1999; Ogubanjo & Knapp van Bogaert 2008). In 
this case, the individual or a person acting on that individual’s behalf (physician or lay 
person, depending on the law of the country) takes active steps to hasten death (LaFollette, 
1997). That active step can be either the provision of the means (i.e. a lethal drug) for self-
administration (orally or parenterally), or the administration by a tier. The provision of the 
means to die is called assisted suicide, assistance in dying, or physician assisted suicide. The 
patient acts last. With voluntary active euthanasia the assistant acts last.  Doctor Jack 
Kevorkian’s (dubbed “doctor death”) “Mercitron” is an example of assisted suicide. The 
contraption is hooked to the candidate who initiates the delivery of the lethal drug. With 
voluntary active euthanasia the lethal drug needs to be administered by an assistant because 
the candidate is physically unable to proceed unaided. In both circumstances, the individual 
expresses a competent and voluntary wish to die, and the conditions that would make it 
right to allow or assist a suicide are satisfied. In both cases the aim is to spare that person 
pain, indignity, emotional and financial burdens. Yet, suicide is seen as morally 
reprehensible but is not prohibited by any law. Voluntary active euthanasia, on the other 
hand, is illegal in most countries and the object of conflicting and polarised moral debates. 
Physician assisted suicide involves an affirmative act, writing a prescription or providing 
the lethal drug. Voluntary active euthanasia requires the acts of providing and administering 
the lethal drug. In physician-assisted suicide, the individual who wishes to die poses the 
final act; in voluntary active euthanasia, because that individual is unable to pose the last 
act, a proxy acts on his or her behalf. The difference is about the person who acts last. The 
intention and motivation are the same. Therefore, one might wonder whether the distinction 
is not a kind of hypocritical hair splitting. It reminds us of the omission/commission 
debates and of the doctrine of double effect. 
The doctrine of double effect states that for an action with two consequences, one good and 
one bad, to be morally permissible the bad consequence may be foreseeable but not 
intended, and the bad cannot be used to achieve the good. The Dutch debate about indirect 
euthanasia is a case in point. “Terminal sedation” is legally permissible; it consists of 
administering large oral doses of barbiturates to induce coma followed by neuromuscular 
blocking agent to cause death on request of patients hoping their death to be hastened 
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(Veldink et al., 2002). Death is foreseen (and in fact wished by the candidate) but not 
intended. Furthermore, the candidate takes the first step actively; the second step inevitably 
requires the active intervention of an assistant. So, here we have two actors with the same 
motives. Both foresee the result. To claim that it is not intended is sheer casuistry. 
Many red tapes need to be overcome by those wishing to die. The main reason is to avoid 
the legendary “What if?” In spite of good evidence against it, the most commonly advanced 
reason is avoiding the slippery slope. For instance, in Switzerland, where assisted suicide 
and voluntary active euthanasia have been tolerated (though not legal it is not prosecuted if 
the assistant has no hidden agenda, i.e. personal interest in the death of the assisted person) 
since 1918, it accounts for 0.45 percent of deaths, only a little more than the 0.3 percent in the 
Netherlands (Veldink et al. 2002; Van der Heide et al., 2007). The candidate has to activate 
the “death machine” or has to swallow the lethal drug; in other cases the candidate first 
ingests the drug but the final blow is administered by a tier. The death is foreseen but not 
intended. Who is the actor? What is active (commission) and what is passive (omission)? 
Removing a feeding tube is an act of commission; since the intention is death it is killing. 
Not pouring sustenance in the tube is omission, letting die. The intention is the same; the 
type of action is different. Does it really matter? As pointed out by Sullivan (1999), the 
debate places the doctor at the centre instead of the applicant, it leaves out the good of the 
person who wishes to die, which is the purpose of end of life decisions. 
2. Facing death  
Etymologically, euthanasia means a good or happy death. Many might wonder if death 
could ever be a happy event. To be good, death should be desired and ought to be peaceful 
and painless. The concept of euthanasia would not apply to a person who slips away 
peacefully and painlessly without any intervention after a fulfilled life. Euthanasia requires 
an intervention by the person wishing to die or by a person acting on her behalf to hasten a 
wanted death. 
The word euthanasia has three meanings: 1) a quiet, peaceful, and painless death; 2) the 
means of procuring it; and 3) the action inducing it. What is missing is that the three 
definitions leave out the good of the person whose death is in question and that the death is 
desired by that person and for its own sake. Euthanasia cannot be morally justified unless it 
benefits the person who dies (Foot, 1996), and if no one else is harmed by it (Hook, 1995). 
Some might consider that death is welcome after a happy and fulfilled life. Others who had 
an unhappy life or who are burdened with sorrow and suffering view death as deliverance. 
It seems, though, that for many who are clinging to life death is the last thing on their wish 
list. In other words, death is inevitable and is either wished or feared. 
LaFollette (1997) has argued that we have not decided to enter life, but that we should be 
granted the right to choose to exit life. Such view, of course, is highly debatable and 
debated. Those who believe in the principle of sanctity of life argue that life is God given; 
therefore, God only can take it back. This argument does not hold for non-believers though. 
The principle that life is sacred, says Dworkin (1995), “that’s the easy part”; the crucial 
question is which decisions best respect it.  
One must respect the wishes of those, believers or not, who wish to stay alive no matter 
what. On the other hand, to what extent should one respect the wish to die? One answer 
would be allowing them to commit suicide. Every one has the right to commit suicide; no 
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single law prohibits suicide. However, one may not have the courage or the means to take 
that step. Considering suicide one may be discouraged by the impact it has on one’s loved 
ones. However, this argument is double-edged. The person who plans committing suicide 
may well make this decision because his entourage failed him. In that case, should he refrain 
from the act to avoid guilt feelings and remorse among the survivors?  
Is there a right to die? Is there a duty to die? If there is a right to die, is there a correlative 
duty of a tier party to assist in dying? 
In an attempt to answer these though questions the topic of euthanasia is riddled with 
inconsistencies and twists. Thou shalt not kill, of course, but it needs qualification: thou 
shalt not kill the innocent (Battin, 1995). It is legally and ethically impermissible to take some 
one’s life against her will. Mass murder in war, camps, or campuses is fittingly condemned. 
Even if this was labelled euthanasia by the Nazi regime, it was murder of innocent and non-
consenting persons. This is not negotiable. Then we have the debate whether killing and 
letting die are one and the same thing or not. Should active voluntary euthanasia be 
accessible only for intractable physical pain? What is the difference, if any, between early 
terminal sedation and terminal sedation? What is the difference, if any, between ordinary 
and extraordinary means to keep some one alive? And last but not least, what are the duties 
of health care providers towards terminally ill patients? As pointed out by Sullivan (1999), 
the euthanasia debate tends to place the doctor in the centre of the debate instead of the 
candidate. It too often leaves out the good of the person who wishes to die (Angell, 1998). 
All these queries illustrate our concerns with death, our own and the other’s. Death is 
inevitably part of life; we cannot avoid taking a moral position, because we can now choose 
to interrupt and delay nature’s progress (Gorsuch, 2006). Euthanasia claims Moreno (1995), 
“appears as the ultimate postmodern demand for personal dignity”. 
3. Euthanasia’s historical background 
Rachels (1993) has given a historical overview of euthanasia from which some of the 
following is borrowed. In Ancient Greece, there was nothing similar to the current view on 
the sanctity of life. Infanticide of deformed newborns and infants was seen as benefiting 
them by avoiding a miserable life. Currently, such practices would be regarded as offensive 
and a deep lack of respect for differently able persons. This is not to say that every one 
believes that non-existence might be preferable to existence with different abilities. Peter 
Singer (1994), notoriously, has argued in favour of the permissibility of infanticide in such 
circumstances. Needless to say that Singer’s view did provoke public outrage. 
Hippocratic physicians represented only a small minority of all self-proclaimed healers. 
Markel (2004) claims that it is doubtful that Hippocrates would recognise most pledges 
ascribed to him because many revisions of the oath were written under Christian influence 
during the Middle Ages. In those early times, it was not uncommon for physicians to 
recommend suicide to a patient with incurable disease.  
Even if great thinkers as Plato, Aristotle, and Pythagoras considered that suicide was mostly 
an act of cowardice, they admitted to exceptions. It should also be noted that the 
Pythagorean School of medicine did not follow Hippocrates’ teachings with regards to 
physicians’ duty to refrain from assistance in dying. Pythagoras of Samos (582-507 BCE) 
shifted philosophy from Asia Minor to Southwest Italy, where he founded a school, a 
religious and mathematical community where his intellectual and moral authority was 
absolute (autos ephê, ipse dixit, the master has spoken). Against the Homeric world-view, he 
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introduced features of the mystery religions. Pythagoras’ community was influenced by 
Orphic mysticism. Pythagoras believed in the immortality of the soul (“the body is a tomb”, 
just like later Plato’s “body the dungeon of the soul”). Therefore, one should strive to give 
priority to the soul and respect all living beings because they are all ensouled. Purity of the 
soul was important (because of his belief in metempsychosis) and can be only achieved 
through philosophy – the quest for knowledge, understanding, and competence. 
During the following twenty centuries, Western Europe was so much under the influence of 
Christianity that there was a silent condemnation of suicide and no discussion on euthanasia 
(Curzer, 1999). During the Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant clearly rejected the permissibility 
of suicide. His argument was rooted in the belief that persons have an incomparable worth. 
Suicide degrades humanity. Even during the Enlightenment, it would have been risky to 
express personal liberal view on any topic, in this case to contest the sanctity of life that 
would upset the Church’s fundamentalism. 
It was not until the twentieth century that the legal and ethical aspects of euthanasia came to 
the public fore. In 1918, a comment by the Swiss federal government on Article 115 of the 
first penal code stated (quoted in Hurst & Mauron, 2003):  
In modern penal law, suicide is not a crime … 
Aiding and abetting suicide can themselves  
be inspired by altruistic motives.  
This is why the project incriminates them only if the author has been moved by selfish 
reasons (Hurst & Mauron 2003). The act is called “murder upon request of the victim”, not 
euthanasia. De facto, a 1997 attempt to decriminalise euthanasia failed. The article does not 
require the involvement of a physician nor that the patient is terminally ill. Switzerland 
permits anyone to assist in another’s death regardless whether the candidate is terminally ill 
or not (Ziegler & Bosshard, 2007). The Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences states that 
assistance in dying is “not part of a physician’s activity”. Nevertheless, like any other 
citizen, a physician is allowed to altruistically assist in dying. 
The argument from palliative care (including pain palliation) is often used against assistance 
in dying because of excruciating pain. The promoters of the argument claim that no pain is 
beyond palliation. A survey in Switzerland showed that 73% of palliative care physicians 
opposed the legislation of euthanasia; however, 19% would practice euthanasia if it became 
legal (Hurst & Mauron, 2003). 
In the Netherlands, voluntary active euthanasia is “tolerated” since 1973 (it is not lawful but 
not a criminal offence) provided strict guidelines, called “due care criteria” (also referred to 
as careful practice, and standards of care) are adhered to: 1) the claimant must be sound of 
mind; 2) the request must be voluntary, independent, persistent and fully informed; 3) the 
pain endured must be intolerable and unresponsive to all pain relief methods; and 3) the 
physician must consult with another independent colleague (Battin, 2002; Sleeboom-
Faulkner, 2006). The physician is free to participate or not (conscience clause) (Sleeboom-
Faulkner, 2006). Note that, since the Brongersma case of “life fatigue or existential suffering”, 
the claimant needs not be terminally ill, and the pain must not be physical (Huxtable & 
Möller, 2007). The Netherlands since has formalised its policy in the Termination of Life on 
Request and Assisted Suicide Act 2001. The “due care criteria” including the intractable pain 
remain included. The Euthanasia Act was passed in 2003 to regulate ending of life by a 
physician at the request of a patient who is suffering unbearably without hope of relief. In 
2005, 1.7% of deaths were the result of euthanasia and 0.1% of physician-assisted suicide; 
80.2% of all cases were reported (vs. only 18.0% in 1990) (Van der Maas & Emanuel, 1998; 
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Van der Heide et al., 2007). Terminal sedation is legally permissible. It consists of the 
administration of a high dose of a sedative to relieve suffering without intending to hasten 
death, even if the patient might hope so (Quill, 2007). The Royal Dutch Association of 
Pharmacy technical guidelines of 1987 (revised in 1994 and 1998) recommend the oral 
administration of high doses of barbiturates to induce coma, followed by a neuromuscular 
blocking agent to cause death (Veldink et al., 2002). In the Netherlands, terminal sedation 
and the withdrawal of artificial feeding are regarded as “normal medical treatment” and 
thus different from euthanasia. Therefore, they cannot fall under the same legal regulation 
as euthanasia (Sheldon, 2003). 
Australia’s Northern Territory was the world’s first jurisdiction to legalise euthanasia in 
1996; four people were assisted under this legislation before the Australian federal 
government repealed it in 1997 (Parker, 2005). The Dutch practice is close to the 
requirements of the 1997 Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, namely: 1) two oral requests 
separated by at least two weeks; and 2) a written request witnessed by two persons. From 
the part of the physician: the prescribing and the consulting physician must inform of 
alternatives such as pain control and hospice care (Dieterle, 2007). Note that in Oregon, the 
applicant must be at least 18 years old, competent, and suffering from a terminal illness with 
less than six months to live. As we know, this sort of prediction is alarmingly imprecise. 
Moreover, it might be tricky to determine one’s mental competency, but there is no 
obligation to get the opinion of a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. Finally, any physician 
with a medical degree can assist. 
In 2002, Belgium passed a Euthanasia Law. It carries most of the requirements and restrictions 
as those in the Dutch law (Lemiengre et al., 2007; Quill, 2007). In Germany, there is a legal 
“inconsistency” in the sense that voluntary active euthanasia is illegal but assisting in dying is 
tolerated. The preconditions are that the applicant should be competent and free. The German 
Society for Humane Dying provides the needed support provided the following conditions are 
met: 1) at least one-year membership; and 2) at least two years without treatment for 
depression or psychiatric illness. If these preconditions are met, the applicant is supplied with 
a list of drugs and their dosage for producing certain and painless death. It is recommended to 
acquire the drug through prescription from a physician and to sign a form where the decision 
is signed. A lay companion to assist is provided on request (Battin, 2002). 
4. Definitions of euthanasia 
Euthanasia is subdivided into voluntary and involuntary, active and passive. Involuntary 
means not under control of the will, unintentional, forced. Some add non-voluntary when a 
person has not expressed a choice (Beauchamp, 1996). Involuntary active euthanasia is 
killing an innocent person against his will. Since it does not refer to a “good” death, one 
should avoid calling it euthanasia. 
There seems to be some confusion about the concept of active voluntary euthanasia, and its 
difference from physician assisted suicide. According to Dieterle (2007), in physician-
assisted suicide “the patient him or herself is the instigator of death”; in active euthanasia 
“the physician is the instigator of death”. Brock (1999) writes “with physician-assisted 
suicide, the physician administers a lethal dose often because the patient is unable to do so”; 
but he goes on with the example of Janet Adkins (see below) who acted last. Brock (1999) 
opposes this to (voluntary active) euthanasia, where “the physician acts last”. Rachels (1975) 
writes:  
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The important difference between active and passive  
euthanasia is that, in passive euthanasia, the doctor  
does not do anything to bring about the patient’s death.  
The doctor does nothing, and the patient dies of  
whatever ills already afflict him. In active euthanasia,  
however, the doctor does something to bring about  
the patient’s death: he kills him. The doctor who gives  
the patient with cancer a lethal injection has himself  
caused his patient’s death; whereas if he merely  
ceases the treatment, the cancer is the cause of death. 
This, again, is unhelpful. To die from any terminal illness is a natural death. Whether it is 
accompanied by intractable and untreatable physical pain or psychological suffering is a 
different matter altogether. Notice the vocabulary: the doctor is the “killer”. In the 
euthanasia debate, the use of the verb killing should be avoided because it refers 
conventionally to taking a person’s life against his will. The position of the American 
Medical Association, which Rachels tries to debunk, is “At stake is the intentional 
termination of life of one human being by another” (viz. of a person who did not express a 
consistent and free request of dying) (quoted in Rachels, 1975). 
It seems that the debate has been confused by the fact that in the Netherlands, it has become 
common parlance to talk of active and passive while omitting the fundamental qualification 
voluntary and involuntary. Active voluntary euthanasia refers to a person who makes the 
free decision to end her life and takes the necessary steps to achieve death. The typical 
example is that of Janet Adkins. She was diagnosed as in the initial stage of Alzheimer’s 
disease. She was devastated and wanted to die with dignity before the disease would take 
its full toll. At that time, she was a member of the Hemlock Society, and was living in 
Oregon where physician-assisted suicide and active voluntary euthanasia were then illegal. 
She flew to Michigan, where assistance in dying was not illegal. She went to Dr Jack 
Kevorkian who connected her to the “Mercitron”, a device composed of a pump containing 
a lethal substance connected to an intravenous line. The physician did install the IV-line but 
the candidate had to press the button to initiate the injection. In other words, Janet took the 
free decision to be connected to the contraption, and decided to initiate the procedure all by 
herself (Pence, 1995). The assistance provided by Dr Kevorkian was to make the device 
available. Although he was a physician and assisted by making the means available, this 
was not physician-assisted suicide but rather active voluntary euthanasia. It was voluntary 
and Janet executed the final act. 
Kevorkian was prosecuted for murder by the local district attorney. A local judge dismissed 
the case but ordered Kevorkian to desist from using the contraption. It is unclear on what 
grounds the judge’s ruling was based since assisting in dying was not against the law. In 
1992, the governor of Michigan signed a law making assisted suicide illegal. In 1994, the 
Michigan Court of Appeals overruled the state’s ban on assisted suicide on grounds of 
technicalities (Pence, 1995). 
The striking down of a Washington state law banning assisted suicide followed this. The 
federal judge Barbara Rothstein held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution 
that protects individual liberties was broad enough to cover women’s right to abortion and 
the right of the terminally ill to be assisted in dying. In Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d. Cir. 
1996), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals declared unconstitutional New York’s law 
against physician-assisted-suicide because it is a violation of the constitutional right of equal 
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protection under the law, since it denies help in dying to those without life-sustaining 
treatment, while permitting it for those receiving such treatment (Angell, 1998; Gorsuch, 
2006). 
In 1992, a referendum campaign aimed at toppling the California’s law banning assisted 
suicide failed. In 1993, a similar campaign was successful in Oregon; legal challenges 
delayed the implementation of Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act until 1997. Currently, in the 
vast majority of states’ statutes have been retained or enacted expressly banning assisted 
suicides. In Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), the justices made it clear that there is no 
constitutionally protected right to physician-assisted suicide. However, they expressed 
concern about the inadequacies of access to and delivery of palliative care (Quill, 2004). Terri 
Schiavo was in the same condition as Quinlan and Cruzan. In 1990, at the age of 27 she went 
into permanent vegetative state. In 1998, her husband petitioned the court to withdraw the 
feeding tube. Florida’s Supreme Court refused to hear appeals. A trial court judge ordered 
the removal. Terri’s Law (2003) gave Governor Jab Bush authority to order the feeding tube 
to be reinserted. The US Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal brought by Governor 
Bush. Despite the adoption by the senate of a bill For the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie 
Schiavo (2005), the tube was removed and Terri died (Annas, 2005). 
Passive voluntary euthanasia refers to a person who makes a fully voluntary and persistent 
request to put an end to life but demands assistance from a tier person, either because she 
does not have the courage to do the needful to achieve her goal, or because she does not 
have the physical ability to do it. This is the same as assistance in dying. However, here 
again, Brock (1999) has a different definition; for him passive euthanasia (he omits the 
qualification of voluntary vs. involuntary) consists of withholding or withdrawing life-
sustaining procedures. 
The first assisted death on public record was the Postma case in the Netherlands in 1971. She 
suffered a severe brain haemorrhage that left her partially paralysed, deaf, and with gross 
speech deficits. She repeatedly begged for death. Her physician daughter Geertruda injected 
morphine to induce unconsciousness and curare (an agent that paralyses all muscles 
including the respiratory ones) to kill her. She informed the authorities. She was found 
guilty of murder but was given a suspended sentence. In the aftermath, the Royal Dutch 
Medical association set down guidelines, the so-called “due care criteria”, that were 
accepted by the Dutch prosecutors. Eventually, passive voluntary euthanasia or assistance 
in dying became rechristened as “terminal sedation”, where deep sedation is induced to “an 
imminently dying patient”. It is deemed permissible if it does not hasten death significantly 
(Varelius, 2007). Cellarius (2011) has argued that terminal sedation differs from early 
terminal sedation. He defines early terminal sedation as “palliative sedation in which deep, 
continuous sedation is combined with cessation of nutrition and hydration, orally or 
parenterally”. Because it hastens death, he claims, it is “contentious but not unethical”. What 
is contentious is debatable, disputed. This is unhelpful in the debate. Cellarius (2011) 
contends that deep and continuous sedation is acceptable to treat “intolerable and 
intractable pain”, unless it hastens death. Sullivan (1999), on the other hand, states that a 
decision may hasten death, but that it does not follow from the fact that the intention is to 
bring about death that is intended. Death is only foreseeable. 
This debate illustrates the contentious old doctrine of double effect, now rechristened 
“principle of proportionality”. The doctrine states that if an action results in a foreseeable 
bad consequence (i.e. death), but that this end is not intended, it is morally permissible. It is 
quite clear that terminal sedation and early terminal sedation both aim at a single end, 
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death. To argue that the aim is the relief of pain or suffering is hypocritical. It seems that the 
same sophistry is used to permit withholding of treatment, i.e. letting die. 
Passive involuntary euthanasia refers to a condition where the candidate is diagnosed 
irreversibly comatose. She either has a living will or not. If there is a living will that 
stipulates clearly the conditions in which she declines life-sustaining treatment, the decision 
should be respected. In the absence of a living will the decision has to be made by proxy. 
The proxy can be close relatives or friends who know what she would have chosen in the 
circumstances. In their absence, the decision is incumbent to the healthcare team and should 
be in the best interest of the patient. Now, this is more complex than it might appear. It 
raises the debate between killing and letting die. It raises the issue of the person’s best 
interest and the possible hidden agenda of the proxy decision maker(s). We will come back 
to these issues. 
Pickering (1993) has argued that an advance directive for “voluntary euthanasia” is a 
volatile combination. In brief, the argument stresses that the person who made advance 
directives was not psychologically the same at the time of the writing and at the time of the 
condition leading to coma. Perhaps, if she would regain momentary or permanent 
consciousness she would change her mind. One cannot foresee what type of condition one 
might be in and how one would judge it if one was conscious. It follows, so the argument 
goes, that advance directives should be respected only when the candidate is in a position to 
reiterate the decision made by advance directive. 
The argument is often presented that one has to be suffering from depression to consider 
suicide or assistance in dying. One cannot fully exercise one’s autonomy under the influence 
of depression. Therefore, one should never honour the request for assistance in dying. 
Along these lines, Brock (1999) discusses the “expressed-wishes euthanasia” based on what 
the patient would say if competent and rational. He contends that it is impossible to know 
what incompetent patients would choose if they were competent, even if they have 
previously expressed their preferences. 
All these arguments have some truth, but they boil down to the infamous slippery slope: 
what if? Granted, all life and death decisions are controversial and may be abused. None the 
less, one cannot negate the fact that life and its quality may degrade so badly that death is 
deemed a better choice. 
5. Killing and letting die 
The ethical dilemma is about the difference, if any, between killing and letting die. The legal 
conundrum shows that, mainly in the US, the legality of letting die is variously interpreted. 
Similar cases, such as Karen Quinlan (1975) and Nancy Cruzan (1990), were treated 
differently. Karen was in permanent vegetative state and on a respirator; she was fed 
through a naso-gastric feeding tube. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in favour of 
Karen’s parents’ request to disconnect the ventilator to let her die. The importance 
physicians placed on the distinction between withholding and withdrawing life support 
surprised the Court. The Court applied the right to privacy to allow proxy decision of letting 
die. The Roman Catholic nursing staff, unbeknownst to Karen’s relatives, implemented the 
weaning. Unexpectedly, Karen survived after having been weaned from the respirator. It is 
likely that without weaning she would have died when the respirator was disconnected. She 
ultimately died after 10 years in permanent vegetative state (Pence, 1995). 
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Nancy Cruzan was also in permanent vegetative state and fed through a naso-gastric tube. 
The Missouri Supreme Court overturned the probate court’s decision to allow the 
withdrawal of the feeding tube. This was because, in the eyes of the judiciary, there was no 
clear and convincing evidence about Nancy’s wishes not to be resuscitated if she were to be 
in permanent vegetative state. In reviewing the Missouri Supreme Court decision, the 
United States Supreme Court began to recognise a right of a competent patient to informed 
refusal. The tube was finally removed legally and Nancy died (Pence, 1995). 
The importance of the Quinlan and the Cruzan cases was that they brought about the legal 
permissibility of informed refusal and the right to proxy decision-making about 
withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining procedures. In both cases the issue was the 
artificial feeding. Since food and water are basic human needs, the controversy arose 
whether artificial feeding is an ordinary or an extraordinary means. In addition, it ignited 
the debate whether removing the tube would be an act of omission (letting die) or 
commission (killing). 
The legality of assistance in dying is mostly not recognised. The US state of Oregon, 
however, enacted the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. Oregon’s Department of Human 
Services has the task of auditing a sample of the records regarding each act of assisted 
suicide on a yearly basis. At variance with the Dutch medical guidelines, in Oregon the right 
to assistance in dying does not require the existence of any pain, treatable or not. The 
distinction between killing and letting die has connection with the elusive distinction 
between omission and commission, as well as with the hair splitting and hypocritical 
doctrine of double effect. 
In Active and Passive Euthanasia, Rachels (1975) has argued that there is no moral difference 
between killing (commission) and letting die (omission), but rather that it is “a grotesque 
perversion of moral reasoning”. He opposes the American Medical Association’s denial that 
the withdrawal of life-sustaining interventions equals the intentional termination of life.  He 
contends that it is “patently cruel” to withhold a treatment (letting die) because it results in 
a prolonged agony; therefore, it is more humane to inject a lethal drug (killing). The 
American Medical Association’s position is that in certain circumstances it is permissible to 
withhold treatment (letting die), but that in no circumstances a positive step can be taken to 
end a patient’s life (mercy killing). Note that what the American Medical Association talks 
about is the withdrawal (i.e. “cessation”, not withholding) of “extraordinary means” when it 
is clear that death is imminent. To withdraw is to discontinue something that was given; to 
withhold is to refuse to give. Rachels appears to be mixing both withholding and 
withdrawing treatment. 
Thought experiments are often used as a fictional situation to underpin a moral argument. 
In his paper, Rachels (1975) argues that there is no difference if a person who has a personal 
interest in the death of a child, either witnesses it drowning in the bath tub (letting die) or 
actively drowns it (killing). In both cases the motive and the end in view were identical. 
Therefore, killing and letting die are the same. Now, as Rachels (1975) acknowledges, this is 
irrelevant to the issue under discussion, namely withholding and withdrawing life-
sustaining procedures in medicine. If it is irrelevant to the issue under discussion, it should 
be omitted. He also points out that what matters in the moral judgement are the motives: 
personal gain or a humanitarian motive (which applies to the thought experiment he offers). 
The twist is that, as far as Rachels’ case study is concerned, the problem is about the social 
and parental acceptance of Down’s babies, rather than killing vs. letting die. 
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Now consider the following scenarios. Bill and his wife Nancy are clear about their mutual 
desire not to be resuscitated in case of irreversible coma. This is written down in their living 
will. Both drive weekly to their respective work place in two different and far away 
locations. Bill is involved in a car accident. He has a life threatening head injury and is 
treated by paramedics at the scene of the accident. He is put on emergency life-support and 
transported to the nearest hospital. On arrival, the casualty medical officer judges that Bill 
needs to be ventilated artificially to give him any chance of survival. Bill is intubated and 
connected to the ventilator. Nancy is informed about the situation and rushes to the 
hospital. She is told that the brain damage is most likely to be irreversible. She explains that 
Bill has a living will that is clear about “do not resuscitate” (DNR). The doctor acted 
according to his professional duty to preserve life. Nancy wants to respect Bill’s wishes, but 
the life-support procedures were initiated. There was no way the doctor could have known 
about Bill’s DNR wish. Now what would the decision to pull the plug be, killing or letting 
die? Bill had expressed the will to die if such foreseeable circumstances would occur. The 
life-sustaining procedure should not have been commenced if his DNR will have been 
known, but would it? Even if the doctor had known, would he have let Bill die? Let us now 
change the scenario. Bill and Nancy are driving on the highway to their log cabin at the lake. 
A drunk driver hits their car on the passenger side. Nancy suffers a life-threatening injury, 
but Bill is unscathed. The paramedics arrive on the scene. Bill tells them to desist from 
assistance. Bill lets Nancy die. This sounds similar to Rachel’s scenario where the person 
watches the child drowning in the bathtub. But is it? Nancy has no interest at all in Bill’s 
death. She only wants to respect his living will. However, it is doubtful whether she will be 
allowed. It is very likely that she would be charged of non-assistance to a person in danger. 
6. The right to die: The limits of autonomy? 
In 1973, an exploding gas line burned 67 percent of Donald (“Dax”) Cowart’s body. At the 
time, he was a healthy young jet pilot and amateur rodeo performer. At the scene of the 
accident, he begged for a gun to shoot himself when the emergency paramedics arrived. 
Dax’s prognosis for survival was approximately 20 percent, but his potential quality of life 
was deeply compromised. His request was denied. Against his will he underwent 232 days 
of treatment in Parkland Memorial Hospital in Dallas. Despite the fact that he was deemed 
competent, his repeated refusal of treatment and requests to die where consistently 
declined. Instead, the physicians honoured the wishes of his mother. The accident left him 
blind and gravely disfigured, with only partial use of his fingers. He later became a 
millionaire from an out of court settlement with the gas company. He graduated from law 
school in 1986 and got married. He also became a regular speaker for the Society for the 
Right to Die. His main argument has always been that his physicians had been morally 
wrong to treat him against his wishes (Andersen et al., 1996; Knapp van Bogaert & 
Ogubanjo, 2010). 
The question is: Would it be an act of commission, sanctioned legally and morally, to 
provide someone the means to commit suicide? Recall Kevorkian’s Mercitron. Janet Adkins 
did operate the device herself knowingly and willingly. At the time, assisted suicide was 
legal in Michigan. And still, Kevorkian was requested to desist from repeating assistance. 
Dax, however, was unable to get hold of a gun without assistance. Isn’t there an 
inconsistency? One tends to admit that a terminally ill person has the right to assistance in 
dying, especially if she is in excruciating pain. When burns cover 67 percent of the body the 
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pain is excruciating and there is generally little hope to survive. Dax was in excruciating 
pain (and remained in that condition for the 32 following weeks). And yet, assistance was 
denied. 
As we have seen, the US Supreme Court recognised the legal right to informed refusal of 
treatment or life-sustaining interventions. Unfortunately for Dax that was in 1993, twenty 
years after his ordeal began. 
The right to die from one’s personal perception of quality of life, as it was in Dax’s case, was 
brought to the fore with Larry McAffee in 1985. Twenty-nine years old McAffee became 
almost totally paralysed in a motorcycle accident. In 1989, he decided to file suit in court for 
the right to die because the institutions he was placed did not provide what he judged an 
acceptable quality of life. He designed a switch to be connected to his IV-line that would 
allow him to self-inject a lethal drug by blowing in certain ways into the ventilator. The 
County Superior Court ruled in his favour. McAffee did not commit suicide as he was 
eventually placed in an institution where his quality of life was improved (Knapp van 
Bogaert & Ogubanjo, 2010). 
As commented by Pence (1995), such cases suggest that society often gives severely disabled 
people only three limited, grim choices: to become a burden on their families or friends, to 
live miserably in a public institution, or to kill themselves. Even the last option is often 
denied. Is there any difference between a terminally ill patient requesting assistance in 
dying, given the hurdles of prognostication, and an almost totally paralysed person whose 
lack of quality of life is unbearable? Why would one oblige to the former’s wish and not to 
the latter? 
Like many others, Beauchamp and Childress (2001) remark that if autonomy is the corner 
stone of medical decision-making one has to admit that double standards regulate the 
granting and declining of patients’ autonomy. On the one hand, a patient’s informed refusal 
to life-sustaining interventions is viewed as an affirmation of and respect for his autonomy. 
That is the moral (and legal) permissibility of letting die. On the other hand, the right to 
assistance in dying by mutual agreement between the patient and her assistant is, with some 
exceptions mentioned above, unlawful and regarded morally impermissible. One does not 
always have the ability to commit suicide; for instance, if one is paralysed one cannot 
exercise one’s autonomy. So, killing is not the same as letting die. Rachels (1993) has argued 
that it is the same. If he is right, the mentioned inconsistency must be redressed. 
In the clinical context, autonomy and respect for patients are linked to the notion of 
informed consent or refusal. It is often regarded as a loose expression of patient’s right to 
choose; the health care provider has to comply with whatever the patient decides as long as 
she is deemed competent and properly informed about the alternatives, the risks and 
benefits. This view places the concept of autonomy and respect for autonomy in a narrow or 
minimal perspective. This, writes O’Neill (1988), is a minimal conception of autonomy that 
identifies autonomy with the requirements of informed consent and that regards respect for 
autonomy as a sufficient rather than necessary ethical justification. Instead, she argues, 
autonomy should be understood as a capacity for independent decisions and actions. 
Autonomy is not exercised in vacuo. One is autonomous from something and from someone 
(the health care team, the entourage). Autonomy is exercised in a relational (after 
consultation, exchange) rather than in an adversarial context. And, finally, there are degrees 
of independent decisions. The mere fact of being ill places us in a vulnerable situation that 
may affect our level of independence and degree of willingness to accept the health care 
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professional’s plan of action. On the other hand, a stronger perception of one’s autonomy 
may easily conflict with the reasonable choices offered by the health care team. 
7. Euthanasia and the slippery slope 
One stands on the slippery slope when arguments against one position appear to equally 
apply to the counter position, leading to an undesired or undesirable situation. With 
euthanasia, it would mean that if assistance in dying becomes legally authorised the door is 
wide open to abuse. Corners will be bent so that euthanasia will be practised for other 
motives and outside of the requirements set by the law, let alone that people will be forced 
to die under false pretences. Granted that the risk cannot be denied, one should look 
whether the risk is real or of minimal magnitude. 
Pence (1997) distinguishes three different types of slippery slope: 1) generalising to other 
kinds of cases; 2) unleashing the dark side of human nature; and 3) consistency. According 
to the first one, you first withdraw, say, the respirator, then you stop parenteral nutrition, 
and finally you kill. The slope slips from terminally ill patients, to formerly competent ones 
(e.g. senile dementia), to never competent adults (e.g. brain damaged at birth), and to 
infanticide. It does only if competence is disregarded or misconstrued. The second slope 
slips when proxy decisions are made that are not in the best interest of dying or terminally 
ill patient be it for material sake (e.g. the cost of terminal care, or greed) or out of 
convenience (e.g. the financial and emotional burden of terminal care). In this case, the 
person may be competent or not but coerced into accepting that she has the duty to die. In 
other words, the slope becomes slippery only if one calls voluntary active euthanasia what is 
not a willing and knowing request for help in dying. 
The third slope slips if one uses criteria applicable in one case that are not applicable to 
another. This slippery argument, says Pence, is the weakest sometimes time and 
introspection will tell that criteria may have to change. 
It is unfortunate that the country with the longest “experience”, Switzerland, has no 
validated statistics. Estimates, however, suggest that only 0.45% deaths are assisted suicides 
and that two thirds of the requests are rejected. In Oregon 0.09% of deaths represent assisted 
death, and in the Netherlands they amount to 0.3% (Hurst & Mauron, 2003). These data do 
not mean that “assistance” is not given without the patients’ explicit request. In 1990, a 
confidential enquiry run in the Netherlands showed that 0.8% of deaths were initiated 
without the patient’s request. A similar enquiry was run in 1995 and resulted in a value of 
0.7% showing that toleration did not result in a ripple effect. The same questionnaire used in 
Australia estimated the occurrence of involuntary euthanasia at 3.5%. The difference 
suggests that different cultures may have different potential for misuse (van der Maas & 
Emanuel, 1998). As pointed out by Battin (1995), “It is unlikely that Americans can fully 
understand why the Dutch support their practice of euthanasia, and conversely it is unlikely 
that the Dutch will understand why the Americans are so ambivalent about its legalisation 
or why they are so likely to distort the Dutch practice, until these differences are 
incorporated into both sides of the debate”. 
One of the slippery slope arguments claims that legalising euthanasia will result in 
pressurising the weak and the elderly to accept dying. In Oregon, however, data show that 
those who choose euthanasia are younger, highly educated, and used to be in control of 
their lives (Branthwaite, 2005). 
www.intechopen.com
 
Voluntary Active Euthanasia: The Debate 
 
77 
As Rachels (1993.) comments, there is no denying that there are abuses of virtually all social 
practices. The question is whether the abuses would be so numerous as to justify the 
banning of that specific practice. Furthermore, slippery slope arguments provide no moral 
basis for the conclusion that some acts are morally wrong (Beauchamp 1996). With regards 
to assistance in dying, Pence (1997) remarks that claiming that it is immoral “only begs the 
question, it isn’t an argument”. 
8. Conclusive remarks 
It appears that more is written and argued against than in favour of voluntary euthanasia. 
This is understandable since most people wish rather to live than to die. None the less, there 
are people who wish to die. Their voice must also be heard. The nagging question is why, 
when, and how? As emphasised by Tristram Engelhardt (1995), “to establish the wrongness 
of voluntary euthanasia would require a hierarchy of values that subordinates the value of 
individual liberty to other special values”. 
In this case, we encounter two potentially conflicting liberties: the autonomy of the person 
whishing to die, and the autonomy of the individual who is asked assistance in dying. 
Although Switzerland has, in my opinion, resolved that conflict by permitting legally any 
one who has no personal profit in assisting in dying, other countries like the Netherlands 
reserve this right strictly to physicians. The right to autonomy is equally applicable to 
physicians. Ann Davis (1996) contends that one cannot be autonomous if decisions can be 
overruled by people who do not share our values. Beauchamp (1997) asserts that to refuse 
assistance in dying is harmful because it denies a person’s autonomous wish. Self-
determination, as long as it does not harm the other(s), is one of the main cornerstones of 
ethics. If the exercise of autonomy relieves us from an unacceptable lack of quality of life, it 
should not be morally wrong. 
The legal and ethical permissibility of a patient’s right to withhold (not to allow) life-
sustaining interventions is widely accepted. In this case, that person knows and willingly 
accepts that this will result in dead. This has been dubbed “coming to peace with death” 
(Gorschung, 2006). It is the disease that kills (Callahan, 1999). 
In the case of withdrawing life-sustaining procedures that have been initiated (killing), the 
intention, malevolent or not, is death. The irony is that this fuels a sophistical debate on 
omission and commission. For instance, the removal of a feeding tube is an act, commission. 
To keep the tube but not supplying fluids and nutrients is omission. In both cases, the 
patient will die. In both cases this was the motivation. 
On the other hand, it is deemed legally and ethically impermissible to request assistance in 
dying (if one is unable to, say, press the button). It is killing if one is unable to press the 
button or suicide with some one’s assistance (otherwise called “mercy killing”) if one is the 
last person to act. 
The so-called “joint view” that justifies voluntary euthanasia is based on two ethical 
principles: respect for autonomy, and beneficence (Huxtable & Möller 2007,). Varelius (2007) 
argues that respect for autonomy trumps the principle of beneficence, because the latter 
results in harm even if requested. However, the twist is that the defenders of terminal 
sedation deem it acceptable if the harm is needed to reach the intended goal, pain relief. On 
the other hand, by limiting the right of assistance in dying to physicians, one creates a 
potential conflict between the physician’s duties to preserve life, and to alleviate pain and 
suffering. In the case of euthanasia, one of both duties must be prioritised. 
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By placing the doctor at the centre of the ethical dilemma, the patient’s request is often 
disregarded, minimised, or even put in jeopardy. Furthermore, the debate is all too often 
around generic patients, in ideal circumstances, where the arguments appeal to abstract 
principles (Donchin, 2000). In line with Beauchamp & Childress (1994), one should strive to 
reform ethics and the law to deal with an “apparent inconsistency” between affirmation and 
denial of autonomy. Autonomy is given to those who consciously and willingly refuse life-
sustaining interventions; but autonomy is denied to those who consciously, willingly, and 
repeatedly ask for assistance in dying. 
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